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Abstract
Ethereum is the largest public blockchain by usage.
It applies an account-based model, which is inferior
to Bitcoin’s unspent transaction output model from a
privacy perspective. As the account-based models for
blockchains force address reuse, we show how transac-
tion graphs and other quasi-identifiers of users such as
time-of-day activity, transaction fees, and transaction
graph analysis can be used to reveal some account own-
ers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
propose and implement Ethereum user profiling tech-
niques based on user quasi-identifiers.
Due to the privacy shortcomings of the account-
based model, recently several privacy-enhancing over-
lays have been deployed on Ethereum, such as non-
custodial, trustless coin mixers and confidential trans-
actions. We assess the strengths and weaknesses of
the existing privacy-enhancing solutions and quantita-
tively assess the privacy guarantees of the Etherum
blockchain and ENS. We identify several heuristics
as well as profiling and deanonymization techniques
against some popular and emerging privacy-enhancing
tools.
1 Introduction
The narrative around cryptocurrency privacy provisions has
dramatically changed since the inception of Bitcoin [34]. Ini-
tially many, especially criminals, thought Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies provide privacy to hide their illicit busi-
ness activities [14]. The first extensive study about Bit-
coin’s privacy provisions was done by Meiklejohn et al [32],
in which they provide several powerful heuristics allowing
one to cluster Bitcoin addresses. The revelation of Bit-
coin’s privacy shortcomings spurred the creation and im-
plementation of many privacy-enhancing overlays for Bit-
coin [55, 9, 47, 64]. As of today, several Bitcoin wallets, e.g.
Wasabi and Samourai wallets, provide privacy-enhancing so-
lutions to their users.
∗Support from the project 2018-1.2.1-NKP-00008: Exploring the
Mathematical Foundations of Artificial Intelligence of the Hungarian
Government.
Previous work has focused on assessing the privacy guar-
antees provided by several UTXO-based (unspent transac-
tion output) cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin [2, 32], Mon-
ero [13, 33, 7] or Zcash [5, 6, 7, 24, 53].
However, perhaps surprisingly, until today there were
no similar studies on account-based cryptocurrency privacy
provisions. Therefore in this work, we put forth the problem
of studying the privacy guarantees of Ethereum’s account-
based model. Assessing and understanding the privacy
guarantees of cryptocurrencies is essential as the lack of fi-
nancial privacy is detrimental to most cryptocurrency use
cases. Furthermore, there are state-sponsored companies
and other entities, e.g. Chainalysis [38], performing large-
scale deanonymization tasks on cryptocurrency users.
In contrast to the UTXO-model, many cryptocurrencies
apply the account model. In an account-based cryptocur-
rency, users store their assets not in UTXOs but in accounts.
Already in the Bitcoin whitepaper, Nakamoto [34] suggested
that “a new key pair should be used for each transaction to
keep them from being linked to a common owner.” Despite
this suggestion, account-based cryptocurrency users tend to
use only a handful of addresses for their activities. The
account-based model reinforces address-reuse on the proto-
col level. This behavior practically makes the account-based
cryptocurrencies inferior to UTXO-based currencies from a
privacy point of view.
Previously, several works have identified the privacy
shortcomings of the account-based model, specifically in
Ethereum. Those works have proposed trustless coin mix-
ers [31, 49, 51] and confidential transactions [61, 10, 12].
However, until recently, none of these schemes has been
deployed on Ethereum. Even today, Ethereum’s privacy-
enhancing overlays are still in a nascent, immature phase
especially in comparison with Bitcoin’s well-established coin
mixer scene.
Our contributions:
• We identify and apply several quasi-identifiers stem-
ming from address reuse (time-of-day activity, trans-
action fee, transaction graph), which allow us to profile
and deanonymize Ethereum users.
• We establish several heuristics to decrease the privacy
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guarantees of non-custodial mixers on Ethereum.
• We describe a version of the Danaan-gift attack [6] ap-
plicable in Ethereum.
• We collect and analyze a wide source of Etherum re-
lated data, including Ethereum name service, Ether-
scan blockchain explorer, Tornado Cash mixer con-
tracts, and Twitter.
• We release the collected data as well as our source code
for further research1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review related work. In Section 3, we give a brief back-
ground on Ethereum and its inner workings. In Section 4,
we describe our collected data. In Section 5, we overview the
literature on quantifying deanonymization methods and pro-
pose our evaluation metrics. In Section 6 and 7, we describe
our main methods to pair Ethereum accounts that belong to
the same user and link Tornado deposits and withdrawals.
We describe a variant of the Danaan-gift attack in Section 8.
Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 9 by pointing out
promising directions for future work.
2 Related Work
First results on Ethereum deanonymization [27] attempted
to directly apply both on-chain and peer-to-peer (P2P) Bit-
coin deanonymization techniques. The starting point of our
work is that common deanonymization methods for Bitcoin
may not be applicable to Ethereum due to differences in
Ethereum’s P2P stack and account-based model.
The relevant body of more recent literature takes two
different approaches. The first analyzes and clusters
Ethereum smart contracts with unsupervised clustering
techniques [39]. Kiffer et al. [25] assert a large degree of
code reuse which might be problematic in case of vulnerable
and buggy contracts.
The second and more relevant branch of literature ana-
lyzes and clusters addresses in Ethereum. A crude and ini-
tial analysis had been made by Payette et al., who clusters
the Ethereum address space into only four different clus-
ters [41]. More interestingly Friedhelm Victor proposes ad-
dress clustering techniques based on participation in certain
airdrops and ICOs [56]. These techniques are indeed pow-
erful, however, they do not generalize well as it assumes
participation in certain on-chain events. Our techniques are
more general and are applicable to all Ethereum addresses.
Victor et al. gave a comprehensive measurement study of
Ethereum’s ERC-20 token networks, which further facili-
tates the deanonymization of ERC-20 token holders [57].
A completely different and unique approach is taken
by [29], which uses stylometry to deanonymize smart con-
tract authors and their respective accounts. The work had
been used to identify scams on Ethereum.
1https://github.com/ferencberes/ethereum-privacy
1. Deposit tx
2. Withdraw tx
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Figure 1: Schematic depiction of non-custodial mixers on
Ethereum
3 Background
In this section we provide some background on cryptocur-
rency privacy-enhancing technologies. We provide more el-
ementary preliminaries on Ethereum and its applied gas
mechanism in Appendix A.
3.1 Non-custodial mixers
Coin mixing is a prevalent technique to enhance transaction
privacy of cryptocurrency users. Coin mixers may be cus-
todial or non-custodial. In case of custodial mixing, a user
wishing to enhance her privacy sends her “tainted” coins to
a trusted party, who in return sends back “clean” coins after
some timeout. This solution is not satisfactory as the user
does not retain ownership of her coins during the course of
mixing. Hence, the trusted mixing party might just steal
funds, as it already happened with custodial mixers [32].
Motivated by the drawbacks of custodial mixers, recently
there have been several proposed non-custodial mixers in
the literature [31, 60, 49, 51]. The recurring theme of non-
custodial mixers is to replace the trusted mixing party with a
publicly verifiable transparent smart contract or with secure
multi-party computation (MPC). Non-custodial mixing is a
two-step procedure. First, users wishing to mix coins deposit
equal amounts of ether or other tokens into a mixer contract
from an address A, see Figure 1. After some user-defined
time interval, they can withdraw their deposited coins with
a withdraw transaction to a fresh address B. In the with-
draw transaction, users can prove to the mixer contract that
they deposited without revealing which deposit transaction
was issued by them by using one of several available crypto-
graphic techniques, including ring signatures [31], verifiable
shuffles [49], threshold signatures [51], and zkSNARKs [60].
3.2 Ethereum Name Service
Ethereum Name Service (ENS) is a distributed, open,
and extensible naming system based on the Ethereum
blockchain. In spirit it is similar to the well-known Domain
Name Service (DNS). However, in ENS the registry is imple-
mented in Ethereum smart contracts2, hence it is resistant
to DoS attacks and data tampering. Like DNS, ENS oper-
ates on a system of dot-separated hierarchical names called
2See: https://docs.ens.domains
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Source Total At least 5 Used as ground
sent txs truth pairs
Twitter 1364 1260 129
Tornado Cash 2361 1618 ∗189
Humanity-Dao 695 602 n/a
All 4259 3321 318
Table 1: Number of Ethereum addresses collected from three
different sources. ∗Tornado ground truth pairs are only
heuristically identified, see Section 7.1.
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Figure 2: Unique address count of ENS names collected from
Twitter. Most of the ENS names in our collection are linked
to a single Ethereum address, while some entities use multi-
ple accounts. In Section 6, we use ENS names with exactly
two unique addresses (green) to measure the performance
of different profiling techniques.
domains, with the owner of a domain having full control
over subdomains. ENS maps human-readable names like
alice.eth to machine-readable identifiers such as Ethereum
addresses. Therefore, ENS provides a more user-friendly
way of transferring assets on Ethereum, where users can use
ENS names (alice.eth) as recipient addresses instead of
the error-prone hexadecimal Ethereum addresses.
4 Data collection
We collected addresses presumably belonging to regular
users and not automatic (trader or exchange) bots from the
following publicly available data sources. Twitter: By us-
ing the Twitter API, we were able to collect 890 ENS names
included in Twitter profiles, and discover the connected
Ethereum addresses, see Figure 2. Humanity DAO:3A hu-
man registry of Ethereum users, which can include a Twit-
ter handle in addition to the Ethereum address. Tornado
Cash mixer contracts: We collected all Ethereum ad-
dresses that issued or received transactions from Tornado
Cash mixers. Table 1 shows the total number of addresses
collected from each data source as well as addresses with at
least 5 sent transactions. We note that there are overlaps
between the three address groups.
3See: https://www.humanitydao.org/humans
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Figure 3: Average number of transactions sent or received
by the addresses of each data source. Tornado accounts
have less transactions as the service has only recently been
launched.
By using the Etherscan blockchain explorer API, we col-
lected 1,155,188 transactions sent or received by the ad-
dresses in our collection. The final transaction graph con-
tains 159,339 addresses. The transactions span from 2015-
07-30 till 2020-04-04. The distribution of the number of
transactions sent by each Ethereum address follows a power-
law distribution. Figure 3 shows the average number of
transactions sent and received in the three data sources.
Addresses collected from Twitter and Humanity DAO have
similar behavior, while Tornado accounts have fewer trans-
actions since Tornado Cash has only recently been launched.
Finally, using the Etherscan Label Word Cloud, we man-
ually collected service category labels (e.g. exchange, gam-
bling, stablecoins) related to the most popular addresses in
our data set. We summarize the fraction of ENS names in
our collection that interacted with the given services in Fig-
ure 4. We observed that the publicly revealed ENS names al-
ready expose sensitive activities such as gambling and adult
services. Therefore, users should avoid sensitive activities
on addresses easily linkable to their public identities, such
as ENS name or their Twitter handle.
5 Evaluation measures
In this paper, we propose deanonymization methods for pair-
ing Etherum accounts of the same user (Section 6), Tornado
deposits and withdrawals (Section 7), and fingerprinting ac-
counts (Section 8). To establish an appropriate measure for
evaluating our methods, we face the diversity and complex-
ity of estimates of the adversary’s success to breach privacy.
In the literature, the adversary’s output takes the form of a
posterior probability distribution, see the survey [58].
The simplest metrics consider the success rate of a
deanonymizing adversary. Metrics such as accuracy, cov-
erage, fraction of correctly identified nodes [3, 37, 35] are
applicable only when the attack has the potential to exactly
identify a significant part of the network.
Exact identification is an overly ambitious goal in our ex-
periments, which aim to use very limited public information
to rank candidate pairs and quantify the leaked information
3
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Figure 4: Fraction of ENS names (collected from Twitter)
that interacted with the given service topics. Popular ser-
vices within the categories are shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Most popular services within the Defi, Exchange,
Stablecoins and Gaming categories.
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as risk for a potential systematic deanonymization attack.
For this reason, we quantify non-exact matches, since even
though our deanonymizing tools might not exactly find a
mixing address, they can radically reduce the anonymity
set, which is still harmful to privacy. We want to quantify
the information leaked from network structure, time-of-day
activity, and gas price usage to assess the implications for
the future privacy [36] of the account owners.
In our first two deanonymization experiments, our algo-
rithms will return a ranked list of candidate pairs for each
account in our testing set. Based on the ranked list, we pro-
pose a simple metric, the average rank of the target in the
output.
Recent results consider deanonymization as a classifica-
tion task and use AUC for evaluation [30]. In our experi-
ments, we will compute AUC by the following claim:
Lemma 5.1. Consider a set of accounts a, each with a set
of candidate pairs c(a) such that exactly one in c(a) is the
correct pair of a. Let an algorithm return a ranked list of all
sets c(a). The AUC of this algorithm is equal to the average
of r(a)/|c(a)| over all a, where r(a) is the rank of the correct
pair of a in the output.
Proof. Follows since AUC is the probability that a randomly
selected correct record pair is ranked higher than another
incorrect one [23].
Finally, we consider evaluation by variants of entropy,
which quantify privacy loss by the number of bits of ad-
ditional information needed to identify a node. Defining
entropy is difficult in our case for two reasons. First, our
algorithms provide a ranked list and not a probability dis-
tribution. Second, for Tornado mixer deanonymization, the
anonymity set size is dynamic, as users can freely deposit
anytime they wish, hence increasing the anonymity set size.
In the literature, entropy based evaluation considers the
a priori knowledge without a deanonymization method
and the a posteriori knowledge after applying one [50].
Several papers compute the entropy of the a posteriori
knowledge [50, 15, 36], however they assume that the
deanonymizer outputs a probability distribution of the can-
didate records [36].
The information the attacker has learned with the attack
can be expressed as the difference of the a priori and a pos-
teriori entropy. We call this difference the entropy gain,
denoted as gain(n, p) where n and p are the anonymity set
size and probability distribution, respectively. The a priori
entropy of the target record is typically the base-2 loga-
rithm of the a priori anonymity set size. The problem with
varying a priori anonymity set size is that while correctly
selecting ten candidate users from a pool of a million is a
great achievement, the same entropy of log2(10) is achieved
without deanonymization if the initial pool size, for example
in a low-utilization mixer, is only 10. We note that in [15],
the authors also divide the entropy gain to normalize the
value.
Next, we describe a new method to infer the a posteriori
distribution given varying a priori knowledge and appropri-
ately normalize with respect to the a priori entropy. More
precisely, first we give a heuristic argument that the a priori
anonymity set size has little effect on the entropy gain, and
hence we can compare and average across different measure-
ments. In the formula below, given an a priori anonymity
set size 2n vs. n, we compare the entropy gain of the same
distribution p, gain(2n, p)−gain(n, p). In the formula below,
pi denotes the probability p([(i− 1)/(2n), i/(2n)]).
gain(2n, p) = log2(2n) +
2n∑
i=1
pi log2(pi);
gain(n, p) = log2(n) +
n∑
i=1
(p2i−1 + p2i) log2(p2i−1 + p2i).
Since log2(2n) − log2(n) = 1 =
∑
i pi, we may group the
terms to obtain the difference in the entropy gain as the
sum for 1 ≤ i ≤ n of
p2i−1 log2
(
2p2i−1
p2i−1 + p2i
)
+ p2i log2
(
2p2i
p2i−1 + p2i
)
, (1)
which can be bounded from above by using log x < x− 1 as
(p2i−1 − p2i)2
p2i−1 + p2i
. (2)
If the probability distribution is smooth with little density
changes in a neighborhood, the above value is very small.
For example, the value is small if pi is monotonic in i, which
at least approximately holds in our experiments.
Based on the above argument, we may infer an empir-
ical probability distribution of the candidates ranked
by an algorithm. For each a priori size n and rank r for
the ground truth pair of a target record, we define the dis-
tribution P (n, r) to be uniform in [(r − 1)/n, r/n], and 0
elsewhere, in accordance with formula (1). The empirical
probability distribution of an algorithm will be the average
of P (n, r) over all the output of the algorithm. In the dis-
cussion, we will use the entropy gain of the above empiri-
cal probability distribution to quantify the deanonymization
power of our algorithms.
6 Finding Ethereum accounts of the
same user
In this section, we introduce our approach to identify pairs
of Ethereum accounts that belong to the same user. In our
measurements, we investigated three quasi-identifiers of the
account owner: the active time of the day, the gas price se-
lection, and the location in the Ethereum transaction graph.
We evaluate our methods by using the set of address
pairs in our collection that belong to the same name in
the Ethereum Name Service (ENS), see Figure 2. We con-
sider 129 ENS names with exactly two Ethereum addresses
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Figure 7: Normalized gas price distribution of Ethereum
transactions. Outliers above 5 are omitted.
to avoid the possible validation bias caused by ENS names
with more than two addresses. We also note that Ethereum
addresses connected to multiple ENS names were excluded
from our experiments.
6.1 Time-of-day transaction activity
Ethereum blockchain transaction timestamps reveal the
daily activity patterns of the account owner, see Figure 6.
In the top row of Figure 8, we show time-of-day profiles for
two ENS names that are active in different time zones.
Given the set of timestamps, an account is represented by
the vector including the mean, median and standard devia-
tion, as well as the histogram divided into bhour bins.
6.2 Gas price distribution
Ethereum transactions also contain the gas price, which is
usually automatically set by wallet softwares. Users rarely
change this setting manually. Most wallet user interfaces
offer three levels of gas prices, slow, average, and fast where
the fast gas price guarantees almost immediate inclusion in
the blockchain.
The changes in daily Ethereum traffic volume sometimes
cause temporary network congestion, which affect user gas
prices. Hence we normalized the gas price by the daily net-
work average. In Figure 7, the two peaks of the normal-
ized gas price around 0.5 and 1 correspond to the slow and
average gas price options. On the other hand, users only
occasionally charge more than three times the daily average
gas price. The combination of these gas price levels forms
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Figure 8: Time-of-day and normalized gas price profiles for
two ENS names with a pair of addresses each. Both the
time-of-day and gas price selection are similar in case of
matmeth.eth addresses while the addresses of kinchase.eth
have different gas price profiles. Addresses are denoted by
different colors.
the so-called gas price profile for each Ethereum user.
Given the normalized gas prices of the transactions sent,
an account is represented by the vector including the mean,
median and standard deviation, as well as the histogram
divided into bgas bins.
6.3 Transaction graph analysis
The set of addresses used in interactions characterize a user.
Users with multiple accounts might interact with the same
addresses or services from most of them. Furthermore, as
users move funds between their personal addresses, they may
unintentionally reveal their address clusters.
To exploit the transaction network for deanonymiza-
tion, we constructed a transaction graph G with nodes as
Ethereum addresses and edges as transactions in our data
collection. To find similar node pairs in this network, we
use node embedding methods that map graph vertices into
a Euclidean space in a way that nodes with similar neigh-
bourhood are close in the embedded space. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to apply node embedding
for Ethereum user profiling. In our measurements, we used
the graph embedding library4 of Rozenberczki et al. [45],
which includes ten graph neighbourhood preserving embed-
ding methods [28, 63, 46, 44, 43, 40, 11, 42, 52, 4] as well as
two structural ones [16, 46].
We applied the embedding methods after the following
preprocessing steps. First, we considered transactions as
undirected edges and removed loops and multi-edges. We
also removed nodes with degree one as well as vertices that
are not present in the largest connected component. The
resulting graph has 16,704 nodes and 132,231 edges. We
4https://github.com/benedekrozemberczki/karateclub
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generated 128-dimensional representations for the accounts.
In order to combine with timestamp and gas price represen-
tations, we assign the overall average of the network embed-
ding vectors to the removed nodes.
6.4 Evaluation
Based on timestamp and gas price distributions as well as
network embedding, we generate Euclidean feature vectors
for 3321 Ethereum addresses with each having at least five
transactions sent, see Table 1. Given a target address, we
order all other addresses in our set by their Euclidean dis-
tance from the target. We consider multiple representations
by concatenating the vectors of the timestamp, gas price
and network embedding representations.
In the evaluation, we use 129 address pairs for testing that
belong to the same ENS name. The accuracy metrics of
Section 5 for identifying accounts of the same user by using
time-of-day activity and normalized gas price is given in
Figures 9–11. While time-of-day representation works best
with bhour = 4 to 6 (four to six hour long bins), normalized
gas price representation performs weaker and the histogram
gives only very small improvement with bhour = 50 over
mean, median and standard deviation.
The performance of 12 different node embedding algo-
rithms is shown in Figures 12–14 based on 10 independent
experiments. Diff2Vec [46], a neighbourhood preserving em-
bedding technique performed best, followed by Role2Vec [1],
which captures the structural node properties in the graph.
Reciprocal rank combination of Diff2Vec and Role2Vec gives
the best performance.
In Figure 15, we show the fraction of pairs where the rank
of the ground truth pair is not more than a given value.
Surprisingly, Diff2Vec and Role2Vec find the correspond-
ing ENS address pairs within 100 closest representations by
almost 20% more likely than time-of-day activity and gas
price statistics. The combination of Diff2Vec and Role2Vec
further improves the performance.
7 Deanonymizing trustless mixing
services on Ethereum
As the Ethereum community realises the consequences of
the lack of privacy on Ethereum, more and more emphasis
is put on increasing transaction privacy [31, 49, 51]. Hence,
privacy-enhancing tools became crucially important gadgets
in the Ethereum ecosystem. Without doubt, the most popu-
lar is Tornado Cash (TC), a non-custodial zkSNARK-based
mixer. It allows its users to enhance their anonymity by
hiding their identity among a set of participating users. In
this section, we provide techniques and heuristics allowing
one to decrease the anonymity achieved in a TC mixer.
The Tornado Cash (TC) Mixers are sets of trustless
Ethereum smart contracts allowing Ethereum users to en-
hance their anonymity.
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Figure 9: Average rank at different granularity for daily ac-
tivity (top) and normalized gas price (bottom). Dashed
lines show performance with only mean, median and stan-
dard deviation used.
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Figure 12: Average rank for node embedding methods. Ver-
tical lines show standard deviation in 10 independent ex-
periments. Reciprocal rank combination of Diff2Vec and
Role2Vec gives the best performance.
Co
m
bi
ne
d
Di
ff2
Ve
c
Ro
le
2V
ec
De
ep
W
al
k
W
al
kl
et
s
Ne
tM
F
Bo
os
tN
E
Gr
aR
ep
La
pl
ac
ia
n 
Ei
g.
HO
PE
No
de
Sk
et
ch
NM
F-
AD
M
M
Gr
ap
hW
av
e0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
AU
C
Daily activity Norm. gas price
Figure 13: AUC for node embedding methods. Vertical lines
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Reciprocal rank combination of Diff2Vec and Role2Vec gives
the best performance.
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Figure 14: Entropy gain for node embedding methods. Ver-
tical lines show standard deviation in 10 independent ex-
periments. Reciprocal rank combination of Diff2Vec and
Role2Vec gives the best performance.
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Figure 15: Fraction of ENS address pairs correctly identi-
fied within a given maximum rank, for different embedding
methods.
A TC mixer contract holds equal amounts of funds (ether
or other ERC-20 tokens) from a set of depositors. One mixer
contract typically holds one type of asset. In case of the TC
mixer, anonymity is achieved by applying zkSNARKs [22].
Each depositor inserts a hash value in a Merkle-tree. Later,
at withdraw time, each legitimate withdrawer can prove un-
linkably with a zero-knowledge proof that they know the
pre-image of a previously inserted hash leaf in the Merkle-
tree. Subsequently, users can withdraw their asset from the
mixer whenever they consider that the size of the anonymity
set is satisfactory.
Cryptocurrency mixers typically provide k-anonymity
(also known as plausible deniability) to their users [48]. Gen-
erally speaking, a k-anonymized dataset has the property
that each record is indistinguishable from at least k−1 oth-
ers. Specifically, if a mixer contract holds n deposits out
of which n − k had already been withdrawn, then the next
withdrawer will be indistinguishable among at least those k
users who have not withdrawn from the mixer yet. Hence
each withdrawer can enhance their transaction privacy and
make their identity indistinguishable among at least k ad-
dresses. We call the set containing the k indistinguishable
addresses the anonymity set of the user.
In Figure 16, we show the changes in the anonymity set
size over time for four TC mixer contracts (0.1 ETH, 1 ETH,
10 ETH, 100 ETH) respectively. Since TC was launched
in December 2019, hundreds of deposits were placed in the
mixers as more and more user interacted with this service.
In general, we observe orders of magnitude lower activity
for the 100ETH mixer, thus it does not provide as much
anonymity as mixers with lower values (0.1ETH, 1ETH,
10ETH).
7.1 Heuristics for linking mixer deposits
and withdraws
Unfortunately, careless usage easily reveals links between
deposits and withdraws and also impact the anonymity of
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Figure 16: The number of total deposits in each TC mixer
over time. This is an upper bound for the achievable
anonymity set size when a withdraw transaction is executed.
The popularity of the 0.1ETH mixer is superior compared
to higher value mixers.
other users, since if a deposit can be linked to a withdraw,
it will no longer belong to the anonymity set. Next, we list
three usage patterns that can be used to link deposits and
withdraws. The simplest careless usage is applying the same
address for deposit and withdraw transactions as well:
Heuristic 1. If there is an address from where a deposit
and also a withdraw has been made, then we consider these
deposits and withdraws linked.
The next heuristic is based on salient gas price settings.
Most wallet softwares, e.g. Metamask or My Ether Wallet,
automatically sets gas prices as multiples of Gwei (109 wei,
i.e. giga wei). However, one can observe gas prices whose
last 9 digits are non-zero, hence those gas prices are likely
set by the transaction issuer manually. These custom-set gas
prices can be used to link deposits and withdraw transac-
tions. For instance, one might observe the deposit transac-
tion5 at block height 9, 418, 956 with 5.130909091 Gwei gas
price. Later on, there is a withdraw transaction6 at block
height 9, 419, 096 in the Ethereum blockchain with exactly
the same custom-set gas price. This deposit and withdraw
pair can be linked.
Heuristic 2. If there is a deposit-withdraw pair with unique
and manually set gas prices, then we consider them as linked.
Frequently, users reveal links between their deposit and
withdraw addresses if they sent transactions from one of
their addresses to another address belonging to them. We
conjecture that users falsely expect that withdraw addresses
are clean, therefore they can send transactions from any ad-
dress to their clean withdraw addresses. However, if the
withdraw address can be linked to one of their deposit ad-
dresses, then they effectively lose all privacy guarantee ac-
complished by the fresh withdraw address. Express differ-
ently, if users run out of clean funds at their fresh addresses,
they might feel tempted to move ”dirty” assets to their
”clean” addresses. Again, such a transaction links ”clean”
and ”dirty” addresses which is captured by the following
heuristic.
5Depositor:0x074a3e9451fe3fb47be47786cf2dc4e84e797a6f
6Withdrawer:0x0f2437ff38e032596f2226873038230dcb22c485
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Figure 17: Elapsed time in days between linked deposit and
withdraw transactions for the 0.1 ETH mixer contract. Vast
majority of users do not wait more than one day to withdraw
their deposits.
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Figure 18: For each mixer, the number of withdraw-deposit
pairs linked by Heuristics 2–3 such that the deposit is not
later than the day or the week before, or any time in the
past.
Heuristic 3. Let d be a deposit and w a withdraw address
in a TC mixer. If there is a transaction between d and w
(or vice versa), we consider the addresses linked.
One could easily generalize Heuristic 3 by requiring trans-
actions to be sent from not only a depositor address d, but
rather from any address in the cluster of addresses contain-
ing d. However, we leave the implementation of this gener-
alization for future work.
Applying Heuristics 1–3, we found 218, 110, 60, and 7
withdraws linked in the four mixer contracts (0.1 ETH, 1
ETH, 10 ETH, 100 ETH) respectively, see Table 2. We note
that withdraws identified by Heuristic 2 can also overlap
with other withdraws identified by Heuristic 1 or 3. Hence
the number of total linked withdraws are less than the sum
of all withdraws individually identified by each heuristic.
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Figure 19: Withdraw address reuse in the 0.1 ETH mixer
contract. Many users withdraws multiple deposits to the
same address, which ease deanonymization and reduce over-
all the privacy in the mixer.
7.2 Elapsed time between deposit and
withdraw
In Figure 17, we observe that most users of the linked
deposit-withdraw pairs leave their deposit for less than a day
in the mixer contract. This user behavior can be exploited
for deanonymization by assuming that the vast majority of
the deposits are always withdrawn after one or two days.
Even worse, in Figure 19 we observe several addresses re-
ceiving more than one withdraws from the 0.1 ETH mixer
contract. For instance, there are 85 addresses with two with-
draws and 27 addresses with three withdraws. Withdraw
clusters cause privacy risk not just for the owner but for all
other mixer participants as well. Note that proper usage
requires withdraw always to fresh addresses.
7.3 Deanonymization performance
Next we measure how well the techniques of Section 6 iden-
tify the linked withdraw-deposit address pairs. We build
ground truth by using Heuristics 2–3 of Section 7.1. We
define three different ground truth sets, one when the de-
posit is within the past day of the withdraw, another when
within the past week, and the unfiltered full set, see Fig. 18.
Note that our ground truth sets are compiled by using
Heuristics 2–3, and hence are correct up to our best knowl-
edge on the data. Since in Heuristic 2 we used gas prices
and in Heuristic 3 an edge between the two addresses, in
this section, we show gas price only as reference, and omit
the edges used by the heuristic for the network analysis al-
gorithms. As we will see, gas price distribution performs
weak for finding the account pairs identified by the Heuris-
tics despite that Heuristic 2 is based on gas price, adding
the edges between accounts identified by Heuristic 3 would
yield overly strong deanonymization results, since the same
information is used for deanonymization and testing.
Figure 20 shows that an address with withdraw within a
day or week has significantly smaller anonymity set size, on
average, since we only search for the corresponding deposit
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Deanonymized withdraws All
Mixer Heuristic 1 Heuristic 2 Heuristic 3 Total Withdraws
0.1ETH 95 (7.5%) 80 (6.2%) 113 (8.8%) 218 (17.1%) 1272
1ETH 21 (2.5%) 40 (4.8%) 75 (9%) 110 (13.2%) 833
10ETH 8 (1.1%) 9 (1.2%) 46 (6.2%) 60 (8.1%) 738
100ETH 2 (1.5%) 5 (3.8%) 3 (2.3%) 7 (5.3%) 132
Table 2: Number of all withdraws and deanonymized withdraws using the corresponding heuristics in each mixer contract.
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Figure 20: Average rank of the deposit address in the candidate list of our algorithms for the three different ground truth
sets.
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Figure 21: Number of withdraw addresses in the 0.1ETH mixer contract such that the corresponding deposit is identified
within the given rank in the candidate list of each deanonymization technique, separate for the three ground truth sets.
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Figure 22: Entropy gain of our best deanonymization methods for the three different ground truth sets.
in a smaller set. For example, for the 0.1ETH mixer the
original average anonymity set size of 400 could be reduced
to almost 12 by assuming that the deposit occurred within
one day of the withdraw.
We note that in Figure 20 and all other measurements
over the filtered ground truth sets, we do not discount for
the withdraw addresses that are not included in the filtered
set. For example, as seen in Figure 17, for 80 0.1-Ether
withdraw transactions, we list candidate deposits, but for
the remaining 20, we make no deanonymization attempt.
To normalize the results by considering these withdraws,
we have to assume that the corresponding deposit is not
in the 80-element candidate set but in the remaining 320,
thus giving an average rank contribution of 160 for 20% of
the data. Hence average rank for 0.1-Ether withdraws with
deposit within a week have an additional correction of 32
for average rank; by similar calculations, the correction for
transactions within a day is 63.
Daily activity and Diff2Vec have similar performance
while their concatenated feature vectors proved to be the
best address representation; for the smaller ground truth
sets, they identify related deposit addresses within the 20
and 5 closest representations on average. Withdraw linking
performance is further improved by concatenating the two
models. Entropy gain is shown in Figure 22 and the number
of withdraws linked to deposits within a given rank of the
output for the best methods are in Figure 21.
In Figure 23, we show the withdraw linking performance
over time. As the number of active deposits increases, it be-
comes harder to link withdraws to any of the past deposits.
However withdraws that follow the deposit after a few days
are still much easier to deanonymize.
7.4 Maintaining privacy
We do believe if users were using the technology in a sound
way or a privacy-focused wallet software would have helped
them and abstracted away potential privacy leaks, then TC
mixers could possibly achieve higher degrees of anonymity.
7.4.1 Randomized mixing intervals
Mixing participants decrease largely their gained anonymity
by withdrawing funds after short time intervals, cf. Fig-
ure 17 and 20. These heuristics can be defeated by random-
ized mixing intervals.
7.4.2 Fresh withdraw addresses
Currently, many users apply the same withdraw addresses
across several withdraws, see Figure 19. This behavior
greatly decreases the complexity of linking deposits and
withdraws. Therefore users must use fresh withdraw ad-
dresses for each of their withdraws. This issue could have
been easily fixed on the user interface level.
7.4.3 Mixer usage and user behaviors
Mixers mainly attempt to break the link between sets of
transaction graphs associated with Ethereum accounts. As
such, users need to ensure that their on-chain behaviors are
unlinkable between uses of the TC mixers. Therefore, to
ensure maximal privacy, users should use the TC mixers
after every transaction. However, this decreases the user
experience and ability to use applications on Ethereum.
8 Danaan-gift attack in Ethereum
The Danaan-gift attack, also known as malicious value fin-
gerprinting, was introduced in [6]. In a value fingerprint-
ing attack, an adversary sends a cryptocurrency transaction
with a crafted amount to add a fingerprint to the receiver’s
account balance. Although value fingerprinting was orig-
inally introduced in the context of Zcash, we notice that
these attacks are applicable to Ethereum as well. Most
wallet software denominates gas prices in multiples of gwei
(109 wei where 1ETH = 1018wei), hence transaction fees
overwhelmingly (in 98, 1%) do not change the last 9 digits
of an account balance. Albeit, users might set transaction
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Figure 23: Change of average rank in time, cumulated from the beginning of our data, for the 0.1 ETH Tornado mixer by
using our best deanonymization methods.
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Figure 24: Ether account balance fingerprints. Many
Ethereum accounts have an integer account balance. This
allows an attacker to fingerprint the last 9 digits of an ac-
count balance. Account balance fingerprints distribution has
a 4.01 bit entropy and 6.44 bit entropy gain.
fees manually, potentially changing their own fingerprint (in
1.9%). The last 9 digits of an account balance have no eco-
nomic significance (1 gwei≈ 0.0000003$) but could be used
as a fingerprint by an adversary.
First, we measure the fraction of ether transfer transac-
tions that modify the account fingerprint (43, 7%). For the
sake of robustness of the measurements, we chose finger-
prints with the last eight digits. As seen in Figure 24, ac-
count balances are mostly integer values. However, the rest
of the fingerprint values modulo 100,000,000 are moderately
uniformly distributed. The entropy of the account balance
fingerprints is 4.01 with a 6.44 entropy gain. These results
suggest that account balances might be easily fingerprinted.
In the sequel, we estimate the average fingerprint survival
probability.
Let F denote the event that a fingerprint of an address
remains unchanged. To approximate the event probability
Pr(F ), let p denote the probability that a transaction mod-
ified the fingerprint and let x denote the number of trans-
actions sent or received by the given address in our dataset.
By assuming that each transaction is independent from all
others, the fingerprint survival probability of this address is
(1− p)x.
We observe that the distribution of the number x of trans-
actions sent and received by an address follow power-law
distribution ∼ x−k with k = 1.91. The average survival
probability of all addresses can hence be approximated by
the following integral, where we group by x, the number of
transactions of an address:
Pr(F ) =
∫ ∞
1
x−k(1− p)xdx, (3)
which can be computed in a closed formula. The numerical
values are summarized in Table 3.
As the number of transactions sent follow a power-law
distribution, the average value is skewed by the tail of the
distribution. Therefore it makes sense to calculate the av-
erage survival probability for several cutoffs of the tail, see
Table 3. Namely, in each cutoff we only consider addresses
in our data set that sent less number of transactions than
the cutoff value. One can observe how fingerprint survival
probability increases among users with a small number of
transactions. For example, an adversary could successfully
fingerprint 21.83% of the addresses that send not more than
50 transactions. This result is comparable to the 16.6% fin-
gerprint survival probability observed in Zcash [6].
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Tx Addresses Txs Txs Avg. Sent Fingerprint
Cutoff Fingerprinting Txs/Address survival prob.
50 56,399 120,461 61,393 2.14 21.83%
100 56,973 161,427 73,340 2.83 17.97%
500 57,951 384,369 129,431 19.48 6.56%
All 58,367 1,137,558 352,042 19.49 0.073%
Table 3: Balance fingerprinting statistics for Ethereum users. In each cutoff, we only consider addresses that did not
issue more transactions than the cutoff value. We observe that vast majority of fingerprinting transactions were sent by
addresses that send numerous transactions. Fingerprinting an address with few sent transactions is obviously easier than
an address with many issued transactions. Fingerprint survival probabilities were calculated as in Equation 3.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Confidential Asset Pool
Address A Address B
Adversary
Figure 25: Danaan-gift attack in confidential transaction
layers. An adversary can fingerprint (2) an unsuspecting
user’s account balance after she deposited assets (1) in a
confidential asset pool, e.g. AZTEC. Adversary can track
the user when she leaves (3) the confidential pool.
8.1 Danaan-gift attack for confidential
transaction overlays
We foresee that a prominent application of Danaan-gift at-
tacks in Ethereum might be linking confidential transactions
in privacy-enhancing overlays like the AZTEC protocol [61].
In a confidential transaction overlay, users can convert
public amounts into confidential notes. Subsequently, they
can send confidential notes to intended recipients by split-
ting and or joining their confidential notes. The amount of
confidential notes is hidden, yet publicly verifiable by apply-
ing range proofs. Users can also convert their confidential
tokens back to public amounts.
In this scenario, an adversary can fingerprint unsuspect-
ing users inside a confidential transaction overlay, see Fig-
ure 25. Whenever a user deposits a public amount to the
confidential asset pool an adversary could fingerprint her
account. Subsequently, the user might issue several con-
fidential transactions in this privacy-enhanced overlay. If
the victim’s balance fingerprint survives during the course
of issued confidential transactions, the adversary can ob-
serve when the user withdraws funds from the confidential
asset pool by inspecting the fingerprint on the withdrawn
amount. Thus the fingerprinting adversary can assess how
much money the unsuspecting user paid in the confidential
asset pool.
9 Future directions
We expect that in the near future more potent and powerful
deanonymization tools and techniques will emerge. In this
work, we solely applied on-chain data for deanonymizing
Ethereum users. Subsequent tools will likely use a combina-
tion of on-chain and off-chain data. Therefore we deem the
following directions would be extremely valuable for future
work for the broader cryptocurrency research community.
9.1 Further quasi-identifiers
In this work we identified several quasi-identifiers of
Ethereum accounts, such as time-of-day activity, gas price
profile and position in the Ethereum transaction graph.
However, we forecast that many more quasi-identifiers can
be used for further profiling and deanonymizing Ethereum
users. One such potential quasi-identifier is wallet finger-
prints. One could establish which wallet a certain user em-
ploys by assessing how transaction gas prices are calculated.
Different wallet softwares use different methods to compute
suggested gas prices [59].
9.2 Network-level privacy
Assessing Ethereum’s privacy provisions entirely can only be
established if one considers the full life-cycle of a transaction.
Specifically, one also needs to understand how much privacy
is lost when users interact with full nodes or wallet providers.
As the history of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
showed, full nodes and wallet providers can deanonymize
regular users and light clients already on the network
layer [5, 7, 18, 19, 54, 33]. An attacker could establish many
well-connected nodes in the peer-to-peer layer to log the
timing information of transactions. Due to the symmetry of
broadcast, the adversary could infer the origin of the trans-
action [19, 5]. Yet, there are solely measurement studies
on Ethereum’s P2P network structure [26, 20]. Therefore,
it would be worthwhile to conduct a study on Ethereum’s
P2P network, but from a privacy point of view. Fortunately,
several proposals had been made to enhance network-level
privacy for cryptocurrencies [8, 17].
14
Additionally, in Ethereum, special nodes called relayers
gain more and more popularity. Relayers allow senders to
issue feeless transactions, i.e. users can send transactions
from addresses that do not hold ether yet. Such relayer
nodes can also easily deanonymize their users. This is es-
pecially problematic in case of non-custodial mixers, like
Tornado Cash.
9.3 Wallet and Browser Privacy
It has been shown how online trackers and cookies can
aid the deanonymization of cryptocurrency users even when
their coins were mixed through the use of a mixer [21]. Many
users of the Ethereum blockchain make use of a tool called
MetaMask, a browser extension available in most desktop
browsers. As such, for future research, it would be fasci-
nating to analyze how the use of this extension affects the
privacy of Ethereum users, even with the use of mixers. It
may be possible to use the techniques presented in [21] to
deanonymize users. Furthermore, as many Ethereum users
also make use of mobile wallets, it may be useful to inves-
tigate how mobile phones can affect cryptocurrency users’
privacy and assess the privacy guarantees of these mobile
wallet providers [6].
9.4 Privacy of UTXO-based cryptocurren-
cies
We note that the deanonymizing power of quasi-identifiers
(e.g. temporal activity, wallet fingerprints etc.) is also ap-
plicable to UTXO-based cryptocurrencies. Even though in
that case deanonymization is slightly more involved as one
need to apply our techniques not to individual addresses
but rather to clusters of UTXOs. We do foresee that more
potent agencies can and will engage in such deanonymiza-
tion campaigns. We believe that in practice, due to the
aforementioned quasi-identifiers, also Bitcoin non-custodial
mixers provide drastically less privacy and fungibility than
what currently the community expects from those privacy-
enhancing technologies.
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A Ethereum basics
Ethereum is a cryptocurrency built on top of a
blockchain [62]. There are two types of accounts in
Ethereum: externally owned accounts (EOAs) and contract
accounts, also known as smart contracts. The global state
of the system consists of the state of all different accounts.
EOAs are controlled by an asymmetric cryptographic key
pair, while smart contracts are controlled by their code
stored in persistent, immutable storage. EOAs can issue
transactions, which might alter the global state. Transac-
tions can either create a new contract account or call exist-
ing accounts. Accounts have balances in ether, the native
currency of Ethereum, and are denominated in wei where
1ETH = 1018wei.
Calls to EOAs can transfer Ether to the callee, while con-
tract calls execute the code associated with the smart con-
tract. The contract execution might alter the storage of
the account, moreover can call to other accounts - these are
called internal transactions. Contract code is executed in
the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
A.1 Gas mechanism
A crucial aspect of the EVM is the gas mechanism. To ev-
ery EVM opcode, there is a gas amount assigned, which is
deemed to price the computational complexity of that op-
code. For instance, adding two elements on top of the stack
consumes only 3 gas, but storing a non-zero stack element
in the persistent storage burns 20,000 gas. The base gas
fee for every transaction is 21,000 gas, which is not paid for
internal transactions. Therefore, whenever one executes a
smart contract code in the EVM, the execution consumes a
certain amount of gas. At each transaction, the sender needs
to define the maximum number of gas, called gas limit, they
allow their transaction to consume. Usually, due to the dy-
namic nature of the state, one does not know statically how
much gas would her transaction burn. If a transaction does
not consume all the gas assigned to it, then surplus gas is
refunded to the caller, however, if a transaction runs out of
gas, then all state changes are reverted and assigned gas is
taken from the caller.
As of now, gas can only be purchased by Ethereum’s na-
tive currency, ether, at a dynamically changing price, called
gas price. Miners are naturally incentivised to insert trans-
actions with higher gas prices into their blocks to increase
their collected transaction fees.
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